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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration has become an increasingly popular alternative to
civil litigation as a method of resolving contract disputes in the in-
ternational business community. Arbitration agreements have become
a prevalent feature of international commercial transactions and are
often included in international commercial contracts.' Recently, ar-
bitration has become even more effective in resolving international
contract disputes because the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, adopted by the United Na-
tions in 1968, secures the enforcement of international arbitral awards
against those countries that participate in the Convention . 2
The construction contract dispute is one type of agreement that
may be resolved by arbitration or litigation. Because world govern-
ments and international businesses maintain positive attitudes toward
arbitration, arbitration can more effectively meet the needs of the
international business community than litigation. Thus, arbitration
clauses are no longer used primarily in special cases, but are included
in most international construction contracts. 3 Although it would ap-
pear that international construction contract disputes are as easily
arbitrated as other international commercial disputes, international
construction contract disputes often involve multiple parties and can-
not always be effectively and efficiently resolved by arbitra-
l. Leich, The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration,
75 AM. J. INT'L L. 982, 983 (1981)(quoting Acting Secretary of State William Clark in a
report to President Reagan dated May 18, 1981); Bixler & James, International Arbitration-
Basic Principles and Guidelines, CONSTRUcrTON BRIEFINGS, Sept. 1981, at 1.
2. Bixler & James, supra note 1, at 1. Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997,
330 U.N.T.S. 38. For further discussion of the Convention, see infra note 54 and accom-
panying text.
3. Derains, New Trends in the Practical Application of the ICC Rules of Arbitration,
3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 39, 43-44 (1981). The prevalence of international construction
contracts is revealed by the fact that in 1977, 115 of the top 400 United States contractors
signed $15.9 billion in foreign contracts in over 125 different countries. Ford & Reed,
International Construction Contracting-Basic Principles and Guidelines, CONSTRUCTION
BRIEFINGS, Mar. 1979, at I.
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tion. 4  The most effective way to arbitrate multi-party disputes is to
bind all parties affected by a dispute to the decision made by the
arbitral tribunal. 5 However, because numerous agreements are in-
volved in multi-party construction contracts, ancillary agreements may
contain arbitration clauses which differ from the arbitration clause in
the principal agreement. 6  Parties other than the owner and the gen-
eral contractor cannot be bound by the principal agreement's arbitra-
tion clause unless the other parties agree to such an arrangement. If
the other parties do not consent to such an arrangement, it is difficult
to resolve the dispute through arbitration.
The construction of the first natural gas pipeline from Siberia in
the Soviet Union to West Germany represents one such multi-party
construction contract. The United States government was not directly
involved in the Trans-Siberian pipeline project until President Reagan
imposed trade sanctions against European companies supplying equip-
ment, labor, or material to the project. 7 The European companies
affected by President Reagan's ban refused to repudiate their contracts
with the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, eager to resolve the dispute with
the United States, the governments of West Germany, France, and
Great Britain, on behalf of their respective companies, considered
submitting the matter to international commercial arbitration.8
Had the Trans-Siberian pipeline dispute been submitted to ar-
bitration, the question would have arisen as to which international
arbitral process could have effectively resolved the dispute. Because
the dispute involved a multi-party construction contract, the arbitral
process employed to resolve the dispute should have been equipped
to manage problems inherent in resolving multi-party contract disputes.
This comment discusses the advantages and disadvantages of
arbitrating and litigating multi-party contract disputes in the context
of the factual background of the Trans-Siberian pipeline controversy.
In addition, this comment analyzes two kinds of arbitral processes
which could have been employed to arbitrate the pipeline dispute.
These two arbitral processes are analyzed by applying two sets of
arbitration rules, the International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration
4. Most construction contracts involve multiple parties. Generally, the principal
agreement between the owner and the general contractor is surrounded by ancillary agreements
between subcontractors, guarantors, insurers, and financing institutions. Comment,
ICCA: Multi-Party Commercial Disputes, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 545, 545 (1980).
5. Id. at 545-46.
6. Id.
7. L.A. Times, Oct. 18, 1982, § 1, at 14, col. I.
8. L.A. Times, Sept. 4, 1982, § 1, at 9, col. 4.
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Rules, and the arbitration rules adopted by the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law, to the Trans-Siberian pipeline
dispute and will conclude that current international arbitration rules
are inadequate to resolve multi-party contract disputes such as the
Trans-Siberian pipeline controversy. Finally, this comment proposes
changes to the current international arbitration rules which should be
implemented if international commercial arbitration is to be a viable
and effective alternative to litigation.
II. ARBITRATION VS. LITIGATION
Five advantages of arbitrating commercial disputes may be noted.
First, parties that arbitrate avoid litigating their disputes in a foreign
jurisdiction, thus eliminating the risk of facing a hostile court and the
problem of obtaining competent legal counsel in a different coun-
try. 9 Second, in contrast to civil litigation, arbitration allows the
parties to manipulate several factors in the arbitration process. Such
factors include the law and rules to be applied during arbitration, the
location of arbitration, and the composition of the arbitral tri-
bunal.10 Third, arbitration is generally quicker than litigation. The
entire arbitration process takes between seven and twenty months,
whereas bringing a case to trial can take four or more years in many
jurisdictions."I Fourth, arbitration hearings are private and any de-
cisions made by arbitral tribunals are revealed only to the arbitrating
parties, whereas the outcome of litigation proceedings is pub-
lic. 12 Fifth, judicial review of arbitral decisions is limited, thus con-
tributing to the rapidity with which arbitral tribunals render decisions
and to the finality of arbitral awards. '3
Arbitration, however, can be more disadvantageous than liti-
gation in some respects. In certain instances, arbitration is more
expensive than litigation. The costs of arbitration include adminis-
trative fees, which alone can be sizeable, arbitrators' fees and costs
as well as the fees and costs of experts that testify at the arbitral
hearing. 14  Moreover, arbitration does not guarantee that litigation
9. Bixler & James, supra note 1, at 1.
10. Leich, supra note 1, at 983. See also Bixler & James, supra note 1, at 1.
1I. Bixler & James, supra note 1, at 1.
12. Id.
13. Stein & Wotman, International Commercial Arbitration in the 1980's: A Com-
parison of the Major Arbitral Systems and Rules, 38 Bus. LAW. 1685, 1687 (1983).
14. Bixler & James, supra note 1, at 2. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
GUIDE TO ICC ARBITRATION 34 (1963)[hereinafter cited as ICC RULES].
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will be entirely avoided since arbitrating parties may appeal to the
judicial process if the arbitral tribunal renders a capricious, incomplete
or fraudulent decision. 5
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE TRANS-SIBERIAN
NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CONTROVERSY
The construction of the first natural gas pipeline from Siberia in
the Soviet Union to West Germany was the largest commercial venture
ever negotiated between the Soviet Union and Western Eu-
rope. 16 The first phase of the project was scheduled to be completed
by early 1984 at a cost of $10 billion and will link Siberia and Western
Europe by 3,600 miles of pipe. 17 The construction of a second pipe-
line paralleling the first will begin upon completion of the first pipe-
line.' The Soviets will pump 1.4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas
per year through the pipeline. 19
Numerous European countries and European subsidiaries of United
States-based companies were directly involved in the construction of
the Trans-Siberian pipeline. 20 After accepting bids for thirty-eight
compressor stations to be used in the pipeline, Moscow told bidders
that it would not buy goods manufactured in the United
States.2 ' However, bidders for the compressor station orders in-
cluded one consortium consisting of a Houston-based firm, 2 and
European manufacturing associates of United States-based General
Electric Company. 23 In addition, as of August, 1981, the United
15. Bixler & James, supra note 1, at 2; see also ARBITRATION LABOR CASES 3-4
(N.A. Levin ed. 1974) (stating that arbitration decisions are less subject to appeal than court
actions but nonetheless may lead to litigation).
16. Rachlin, Flap Over Europe's Pipeline, NEWSWEEK, July 5, 1982, at 22.
17. Id. The natural gas will run from the Siberian fields to the Czechoslovakian
border and then feed into the existing Western European natural gas distribution network,
eventually flowing to West Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland
and West Berlin. Id.
18. Id. at 23.
19. Id. at 22. Construction of the pipeline will allow the Soviet Union to increase
its supply of natural gas to Western Europe from 9% to 25% per year. Id.
20. In 1981, the Soviet Union and West Germany reached an agreement financing
pipe and equipment deliveries to the Soviet Union. Pipeline suppliers line up for $8 billion,
Bus. WK., Aug. 10, 1981, at 36, 37. Moreover, international consortia from West Germany,
France, and Italy competed for the project manager role, as well as for contracts to supply
38 compressor stations for the project. Id. at 37.
21. Id.
22. This consortium consisted of Cooper Industries Inc. and Rolls-Royce Ltd. Id.
23. The European manufacturing associates of General Electric Co. involved were
Italy's Nuovo Pignone, Great Britain's John Brown Engineering Ltd., West Germany's
AEG-Telefunken and others. Id.
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States-based Caterpillar Tractor Company was almost certain to be
granted more than $500 million in earth-moving and pipe-laying
equipment orders .24
In response to the Polish government's imposition of martial law
throughout Poland in December, 1981,25 President Reagan imposed
trade sanctions on European companies supplying equipment, labor,
or materials to the Trans-Siberian pipeline. As a result, the United
States government became directly concerned with the construction
of the pipeline. In June, 1982, President Reagan retaliated against
European subsidiaries of United States companies which had already
shipped or were in the process of shipping turbines to the Soviet
Union by refusing to supply natural gas or petroleum technology to
those subsidiaries. 26  Reagan refused to lift the sanctions until Eu-
ropean subsidiaries agreed to limit high-technology exports and eco-
nomic credits and loans to the Soviets. 27  However, the European
companies affected by Reagan's ban refused to breach their contracts
with the Soviet Union, most of which were signed before President
Reagan imposed the sanctions. 28  Finally, in November, 1982, before
the problem could be submitted to international arbitration, President
Reagan lifted the sanctions and announced that the Western allies had
reached agreement on a broad and "historic" set of principles under
which trade with the Soviet Union would be conducted.2 9
IV. INSTITUTIONAL AND PRIVATE ARBITRATION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL REALM
Institutional, or agency-administered arbitration is guided by rules
adopted by international agencies such as the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC). 30  International arbitration agencies have only
recently been created by private businesses, professional organiza-
tions, governments, and inter-governmental agencies to provide per-
manent arbitration rules and facilities for the international business
24. Id.
25. L.A. Times, Oct. 18, 1982, § 1, at 14, col. 1; L.A. Times, July 23, 1982, § 1,
at 6, col. 1.
26. L.A. Times, Sept. 4, 1982, § I, at 9, col. 2.
27. Pipeline Ban: Reagan Digs In His Heels, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 28,
1982, at 8. See also L.A. Times, Oct. 18, 1982, § 1, at 14, col. 1.
28. L.A. Times, Sept. 4, 1982, § 1, at 9, col. 4.
29. L.A. Times, Nov. 14, 1982, § 1, at 1, col.5. France and Great Britain, however,
declared they were not parties to the agreement and made no concessions to persuade President
Reagan to lift the United States embargo. L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1982, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
30. See J. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 19-
20 (1978).
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community. 3 Ad hoc or private arbitration operates through rules
determined by the arbitrating parties themselves. 32  The United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has pro-
posed guidelines to be used during international ad hoc arbitra-
tion. 33  Parties who choose ad hoc arbitration may choose to
incorporate some, all, or none of the UNCITRAL rules into the arbitral
process.
There are advantages and disadvantages to using agency-admin-
istered arbitration rather than ad hoc arbitration to resolve international
disputes. Agency-administered arbitration is more advantageous than
ad hoc arbitration because the "non-nationality" of ad hoc arbitration
rules may make the arbitral process confusing and uncertain. More-
over, if the arbitrating parties cannot agree on the rules to be used
during arbitration, or on particular issues which arise during arbitra-
tion, the parties may be forced to litigate their dispute.3 4  Further,
with no permanent arbitration facilities at its disposal, the ad hoc
arbitral tribunal must act as its own administrator and secretary during
arbitration.35 Agency-administered arbitration, however, is more di-
sadvantageous than ad hoc arbitration in that institutional arbitration
may take longer than ad hoc arbitration.3 6  In addition, institutional
arbitration rules may be too formal and inflexible to resolve unusual
disputes . 7
V. THE INADEQUACIES OF CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL AND
AD Hoc INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES IN
RESOLVING MULTI-PARTY CONTRACT DISPUTES
To decide whether institutional or ad hoc arbitration may suc-
cessfully resolve multi-party contract disputes, this comment com-
pares one set of institutional arbitration rules, the arbitration rules of
31. Id. at 19. The duties of such institutions include appointing arbitrators, and
supplying clerical and secretarial services to arbitral tribunals and arbitrating parties. Bixler
& James, supra note 1, at 3.
32. LEW, supra note 30, at 33-34.
33. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules, G.A.
Res. 31/98, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 182, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976)[hereinafter
cited as UNCITRAL Rules]; Text: The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), 27 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 489-503 (1979).
34. LEW, supra note 30, at 34.
35. Id.
36. Bixler & James, supra note 1, at 3.
37. LEW, supra note 30, at 33. For example, institutional arbitration rules may restrict
the choice of arbitrators to individuals who may not be qualified to handle certain kinds of
cases. Id.
432 [Vol. 6:427
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the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC Rules), and the arbi-
tration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL Rules), which guide ad hoc arbitration. In deter-
mining that one set of rules may be more successful than the other
set in resolving multi-party disputes, the goals of international com-
mercial arbitration must be considered. These goals include speed,
limited but effective judicial support of arbitral procedures, neutral
and objective arbitral proceedings, reasonable costs, and limited ju-
dicial review of arbitral awards.3" Using the Trans-Siberian pipeline
dispute as an example of a multi-party dispute, and analyzing how
that dispute would have been resolved under the ICC and UNCITRAL
rules illustrates that both institutional and ad hoc arbitration inade-
quately settle multi-party disputes. 39
A. Background
Although the ICC is located in Paris, France, it is represented
by national committees in over fifty countries. It has created thirty
working groups, such as commissions, standing committees, and
councils, to carry out its functions. 40 Members of the ICC national
committees comprise the ICC Court of Arbitration. The ICC Court
of Arbitration administers arbitrations and holds private sessions once
a month to review arbitrator challenges, approve awards, and set fees
and administrative costs. 4I A "secretariat" located at the Paris office
assists the court by reviewing and filing documents and securing
physical facilities for arbitrators .42
Unlike the ICC, the UNCITRAL does not have a "secretariat"
or facilities to administer arbitrations, or a separate judicial body to
review arbitrator decisions. The UNCITRAL rules were designed for
use by parties with different "legal, social and economic" back-
grounds and to "contribute to the development of harmonious inter-
national economic relations. ", 43  The rules may be used in ad hoc
arbitration or in arbitration administered by a private international
commercial arbitration organization. The parties may designate any
38. Stein & Wotman, supra note 13, at 1687.
39. It should be emphasized that the dispute between the United States and the Eu-
ropean countries involved in the construction of the Trans-Siberian pipeline has been resolved.
Nonetheless, the facts behind the dispute form the basis of a hypothetical situation which is
used throughout this comment for the purpose of comparing the ICC and UNCITRAL rules.
40. Stein & Wotman, supra note 13, at 1695.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1696.
1983] 433
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arbitral institution, including the ICC, as the administrative authority
and/or the arbitrator appointing authority.
44
B. Commencing Arbitration
The ICC arbitration rules are invoked only when the parties to
an international contract have agreed to submit disputes that arise
under the contract to ICC arbitration. This agreement may be made
before or after the dispute arises. 45  Furthermore, an ICC arbitration
agreement is strictly interpreted and binds only the parties that sign
the agreement to ICC arbitration. 46  Similarly, the UNCITRAL ar-
bitration rules apply only to those parties that agree in writing to be
bound by the rules. 47  Because both sets of rules apply only to parties
which agree to be bound thereby, material suppliers to the Trans-
Siberian pipeline project48 could not have arbitrated their dispute with
the United States under the ICC or the UNCITRAL rules unless the
United States had agreed to arbitrate. Because of the strong anti-
Soviet sentiment prevalent in the Reagan Administration, and the
adverse domestic, as well as international, political effects that would
result from President Reagan submitting the dispute to arbitration and
compromising the goals of his embargo, the United States would
probably not have agreed to arbitrate the dispute.
C. Joint Arbitration Clauses
The ICC rules allow joint arbitration clauses to be used when
parties cannot agree on arbitration procedures. 49  When joint arbi-
tration clauses are used, a committee composed of representatives
chosen by each party selects the arbitration location and proce-
dures. 50  This procedure allows each arbitrating party to have its
interests represented when the arbitration rules are selected.
The UNCITRAL rules, however, do not provide for the use of
joint arbitration clauses. This is unfortunate because joint arbitration
clauses may encourage certain parties to arbitrate who would not
otherwise do so if a joint arbitration clause were not included in the
44. Id.
45. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 15.
46. Id.
47. UNCITRAL RULES, art. 1.
48. Some of the material suppliers included Italy, West Germany, France, and Great
Britain. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
49. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 17.
50. Id.
434 [Vol. 6:427
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contract. For example, the United States might have agreed to ar-
bitrate the Trans-Siberian pipeline dispute if it had been certain that
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the ICC would have
jointly arbitrated the dispute. Perceiving the AAA to sympathize with
its position, the United States might have been encouraged to arbitrate
once the AAA became involved. The UNCITRAL rules, on the other
hand, would preclude such an arrangement, thus discouraging the
United States from arbitrating the dispute.
D. Conciliation
The ICC rules include an informal procedure called "concilia-
tion" which may be used before formal arbitration begins. ICC
conciliation, administered by a "Conciliation Committee," may be
used by parties who have not signed an ICC arbitration agreement,
and is organized only when all interested parties agree to concili-
ate. 5' During the conciliation hearing, each party briefly states its
position, supported by documentation, and answers the committee's
questions. After the hearing, the committee compiles a report which
notes the agreement reached by the parties, makes recommendations
through which the parties are encouraged to settle their dispute, or
states the failure of the parties to conciliate.
5 2
The ICC rules do not limit the number of parties that may par-
ticipate in conciliation procedures. Therefore, the ICC rules may be
interpreted to allow all parties affected by a contract dispute to con-
ciliate. Parties to multi-party disputes who have not signed arbitration
agreements would prefer this interpretation so that their claims may
be heard. For instance, even though the United States was not a party
to any of the Trans-Siberian pipeline contracts and thus would not
have been bound by an arbitration agreement included in the contracts,
the United States might have been able to settle its problems with the
European companies through conciliation.
The UNCITRAL rules do not contain conciliation procedures.
This is unfortunate since aggrieved parties are more likely to submit
to conciliation as it is informal, not binding on the conciliating parties,
and yet provides a forum through which parties may resolve their
disputes. Moreover, parties generally prefer to informally arbitrate
51. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 18. Conciliation is conducted by a Conciliation
Committee, consisting of two members from the same countries as the conciliating parties
and a third member from a neutral country, designated as the committee's chairperson. Ford
& Reed, supra note 3, at 7.
52. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 19.
4351983]
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before resorting to formal arbitration or litigation. Thus, the United
States might have arbitrated the Trans-Siberian pipeline dispute under
the ICC rules rather than the UNCITRAL rules because the ICC rules
include informal conciliation procedures. In addition, by encouraging
the United States to conciliate its differences with those companies,
ICC arbitration would have also benefitted those European companies
which could not effectively perform their contracts with the Soviet
Union because of President Reagan's sanctions.
E. Enforcement of Arbitration Rules
The ICC and UNCITRAL rules differ in the manner in which
they are enforced. The International Court of Arbitration enforces
the ICC rules, 53 however no similar international tribunal enforces the
UNCITRAL rules. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (New York Convention)
enforces arbitral awards in general, but does not specifically enforce
UNCITRAL arbitral awards. 54  By choosing ICC arbitration, the par-
ties to the Trans-Siberian pipeline dispute could have relied on the
International Court of Arbitration to enforce and review decisions
rendered by the ICC arbitral tribunal. If UNCITRAL arbitration had
been chosen to resolve the dispute, no tribunal would have existed
to enforce or review decisions made by the UNCITRAL arbitral tri-
bunal. Because disputing parties generally prefer to arbitrate under
rules supported by a separate tribunal that enforces and reviews awards
rendered under those rules, disputing parties would prefer to arbitrate
according to the ICC rules.
F. Selection of Arbitrators
The ICC and UNCITRAL rules differ as to the number of ar-
bitrators selected to conduct arbitration. If the arbitrating parties do
not stipulate to the number of arbitrators to be on the arbitral tribunal,
one arbitrator is selected under the ICC rules 55 and three arbitrators
are selected under the UNCITRAL rules. 56  However, three arbitra-
53. See ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 21.
54. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. The New York Convention became
effective in the United States on December 20, 1970. The implementing legislation to the
Convention is found in Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208
(1976). The Convention is in force in 60 nations. Stein & Wotman, supra note 13, at 1688,
n.16.
55. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 21-22.
56. UNCITRAL RULES, art. 5.
436 [Vol. 6:427
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tors may be chosen under the ICC rules if the International Court of
Arbitration decides that the dispute is too important or complex to be
heard by one arbitrator.57 This is important because one arbitrator
alone may not be able to resolve complex multinational, multi-party
contract disputes, while three arbitrators may combine their different
arbitration skills and approaches to effectively resolve such disputes.
In this respect, both sets of rules may adequately resolve multi-party
contract disputes.
The appointment of arbitrators differs under the ICC and UN-
CITRAL rules. Under the UNCITRAL rules, if the arbitrating parties
cannot agree on the composition of the arbitral tribunal, an "appoint-
ing authority" selected by the arbitrating parties or the Secretary-
General of the United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration may
appoint the arbitrators. 58  If the parties arbitrating under ICC rules
cannot agree on the composition of the arbitral tribunal, the ICC may
select the arbitrators, a process which may take several weeks, if not
months, and delays the commencement of arbitration proceed-
ings. 59  Thus, parties arbitrating pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules
are permitted to participate in the selection of arbitrators by ranking
their preferences for the appointing authority, whereas parties arbi-
trating under the ICC rules do not participate in the selection of
arbitrators. 6° Since arbitrating parties themselves are often more aware
of the complexity of multi-party contract disputes than the arbitrators
selected to resolve such disputes, it is important that the arbitrating
parties, knowing what particular qualifications are needed to effec-
tively arbitrate such disputes, assist in selecting the arbitral tribunal.
Therefore, had the United States and the European suppliers to the
57. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 22.
58. UNCITRAL RULES, art. 6(3). The "appointing authority" sends an identical list
of possible arbitrators to the arbitrating parties. The arbitrating parties rank their preferences
and the appointing authority selects the arbitral tribunal according to the parties' ranked
preferences. Id. However, article 6(3)(b) of the UNCITRAL rules provides that the ap-
pointing authority may decide "in its discretion that the use of the list procedure is not
appropriate for the case."
59. Bixler & James, supra note 1, at 4. First, the court selects the country of the
arbitrator's nationality at one of its monthly meetings and forwards a nomination request to
that country's national committee. Second, the national committee nominates the arbitrator.
Finally, the court must confirm the arbitrator at another monthly meeting. Stein & Wotman,
supra note 13, at 1702.
60. However, both sets of rules are similar in that the appointing authority will
normally select an arbitrator from a country other than that of the parties, thereby enhancing
the neutrality of the proceedings. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 22; UNCITRAL RULES,
art. 6(4).
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pipeline project arbitrated the Trans-Siberian pipeline dispute, UN-
CITRAL arbitration would have been preferred in this respect because
it allows each arbitrating party to assist in the selection of the arbitral
tribunal. As a result, the United States might have been more likely
to arbitrate the dispute.
G. Challenging the Selection of Arbitrators
The procedures for challenging appointed arbitrators differ under
the ICC and UNCITRAL arbitration rules. 6' During ICC arbitration,
any challenge of an arbitrator's objectivity or competency must be
presented to the International Court of Arbitration, but need not be
supported by specific reasons. 62  Because the International Court of
Arbitration reviews all arbitrator challenges, the ICC procedure pre-
cludes arbitrary and unsubstantiated challenges. Similarly, arbitrator
challenges under the UNCITRAL rules must comply with certain
procedural requirements, thus discouraging frivolous challenges. The
UNCITRAL rules, however, provide detailed procedures for chal-
lenging an arbitrator. For instance, UNCITRAL arbitrator challenges
must be in writing, supported by specific reasons, and communicated
to all arbitrating parties, the challenged arbitrator, and the other un-
challenged arbitrators.63  Therefore, arbitrator challenges under the
UNCITRAL rules are procedurally more structured than under the
ICC rules.
The ICC and UNCITRAL rules both provide for the review of
arbitrators' qualifications. Arbitration rules should include proce-
dures to review arbitrators' qualifications since unqualified arbitrators
cannot effectively make decisions. Because multi-party contract dis-
putes are extremely complex, the arbitrators of such disputes must be
well-qualified. Therefore, the need to review arbitrator qualifications
in multi-party contract disputes is even greater than during simple
contract dispute arbitration. Furthermore, to ensure the rapidity of
arbitration, any decisions concerning arbitrator challenges should be
conclusive and nonreviewable by local courts during the pendency of
the arbitration. Neither set of rules permits local courts to review
61. However, the purposes of both sets of rules in this area are similar: the arbitrator
or arbitral tribunal must remain independent and impartial. Stein &Wotman, supra note 13,
at 1704 n.113.
62. ICC RULES, supra note 13, at 23. The International Court of Arbitration makes
the final decision whether or not to replace arbitrators challenged by the arbitrating parties.
Id.
63. UNCITRAL RULES, arts. 9-12.
[Vol. 6:427
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such decisions. Had the Trans-Siberian pipeline dispute been arbi-
trated, either set of arbitration rules would have allowed the arbitrating
parties to challenge the arbitrators' qualifications without judicial in-
terference, and hence, both sets of rules would have been inadequate
in this regard.
H. Selection of Language Used During Arbitration
The ICC and UNCITRAL rules are similar in determining what
language will be used during arbitration. Both sets of rules allow the
arbitral tribunal to determine the language used during arbitra-
tion. 66  Under the UNCITRAL rules, the arbitral tribunal determines
what language is used at the arbitration proceedings based on all
relevant factors and subject to any language provision included in the
disputed contract's arbitration clause. 64 Similarly, the ICC rules al-
low the arbitral tribunal to choose the language which is most con-
venient to the tribunal and the arbitrating parties. 65  Therefore, in
complex multinational contract disputes, such as the Trans-Siberian
pipeline dispute, both sets of rules give the arbitrators broad discretion
to choose the language used during arbitration. Because both sets of
rules would not have precluded the arbitrators from using English
during arbitration, the United States might have been encouraged to
arbitrate its dispute with the European companies.
Because the language of the proceedings is not determined when
the arbitrator is appointed under the ICC and UNCITRAL rules, the
arbitrator may not be fluent in the language of the proceedings. 67  For
instance, in considering all the "relevant factors, ' ' 68 including the
language of the contract, the ICC arbitral tribunal may choose a
language for the proceedings which is better suited for the parties than
for itself. When multiple foreign parties arbitrate it is highly likely
that the arbitrator will not be fluent in the language of the contract
or all of the parties. For example, the parties to the Trans-Siberian
pipeline dispute spoke Italian, French, English, Russian, and German.
To find an arbitrator who could speak all of those languages would
66. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 26; UNCITRAL RULES art. 17(1).
64. Id. at art. 17(l).
65. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 26. The language of the contract is the primary
factor used although other "relevant considerations" may be noted. Stein & Wotman, supra
note 13, at 1710.
67. The language of the proceedings is not a factor in selecting the sole arbitrator or
chairperson of the arbitral tribunal. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 26; UNCITRAL RULES,
arts. 6(4), 7; Stein & Wotman, supra note 13, at 1710 n.166.
68. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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have been extremely difficult. Thus, the arbitrator would have been
required to employ translators and interpreters during multi-party in-
ternational arbitration, adding expense and delay to the proceed-
ings. 69 Therefore, in this respect, under both sets of rules, multi-
party international arbitration would have been expensive and slow.
I. Filing and Amending Arbitration Claims
The procedures for responding to a "Request for Arbitration"
are similar under the ICC and UNCITRAL rules. Within a period
determined by the arbitral tribunal, arbitrating parties may file a
"Statement of Defense" with the claimant and arbitral tribunal in
response to the claimant's Request for Arbitration. The responding
party's Statement of Defense may also include a counterclaim against
the claimant, to which the claimant may respond with its own State-
ment of Defense. 70
The procedure to amend arbitration claims, however, is different
under the two sets of rules. According to the UNCITRAL rules, any
arbitrating party may amend its claim or defense during arbitration
unless the arbitral tribunal considers the amendment inappro-
priate. 71 The ICC rules do not contain an amendment provision.
Because the UNCITRAL rules contain an amendment provision, they
are more flexible and accommodating to facts uncovered during ar-
bitration than the ICC rules. Amendment provisions should be in-
cluded in arbitration rules so that arbitrating parties may amend their
claims or defenses when additional facts and theories of recovery are
uncovered during arbitration. These provisions are particularly im-
portant when multi-party disputes are arbitrated because such disputes
may involve complicated facts and multiple theories of recovery all
of which may not be known when arbitration begins. Therefore, had
the complex Trans-Siberian pipeline dispute been arbitrated, the ar-
bitrating parties would have preferred to arbitrate under the UNCI-
TRAL rules which include an amendment procedure.
J. Reviewing the Arbitral Tribunal's Jurisdiction
Once arbitration begins, the procedures used to review the arbitral
tribunal's jurisdiction to settle disputes differ under the ICC and UN-
69. See Stein & Wotman, supra note 13, at 1710 n.166.
70. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 26; UNCITRAL RULES, art. 19.
71. UNCITRAL RULES, art. 20.
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CITRAL rules. 72  During ICC arbitration, objections to the arbitral
tribunal's jurisdiction are reviewed by the International Court of Ar-
bitration. 73  The ICC rules allow a judicial body, detached from the
arbitral process, to objectively review jurisdictional problems. De-
spite the International Court of Arbitration's review, however, the
arbitral tribunal itself may rule on jurisdictional challenges. 74  On
the other hand, during UNCITRAL arbitration, the tribunal itself
reviews objections to the tribunal's jurisdiction. 75  Thus, objections
to the tribunal's jurisdiction are directed at the same legal body that
ultimately reviews such objections. In any legal proceeding, objective
review procedures are necessary to correct erroneous decisions. The
need for adequate review procedures increases with the complexity
of the proceeding. Hence, in complicated multi-party arbitration, any
decision rendered by the arbitral tribunal, including decisions relating
to the tribunal's jurisdiction, should be reviewed by a neutral, detached
body.7 6  Had the Trans-Siberian pipeline dispute been arbitrated, the
arbitrating parties would have preferred to use the ICC rules which
permit the International Court of Arbitration, a neutral and detached
entity, to review the arbitral tribunal's jurisdictional decisions. 77
72. Challenging the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction to settle disputes before arbitration
begins will not be discussed in this comment. For a good discussion, however, of pre-
arbitration jurisdictional challenges, see Stein & Wotman, supra note 13, at 1690-93.
73. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 23. The court rules on jurisdictional challenges at
its monthly meetings. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. If the challenger presents
prima facie evidence that the arbitral tribunal may exercise jurisdiction, the arbitration
continues. Stein & Wotman, supra note 13, at 1694.
74. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 25.
75. UNCITRAL RULES, art. 21(1).
76. Because one of the goals of arbitration is to limit judicial intervention, these
review procedures need not be judicial in nature, i.e. subject to review by the local courts.
The International Court of Arbitration is not a local court, but an objective, detached ad-
ministrative agency.
77. For example, had the Soviet Union and the European parties to the pipeline contract
agreed to arbitrate their differences and the United States refused to participate in the ar-
bitration by claiming that the tribunal arbitrating the dispute had no jurisdiction over the
United States, and the arbitral tribunal refused to assert jurisdiction over the United States,
the ICC rules would have allowed the European parties to object to the International Court
of Arbitration for the tribunal's refusal to assert jurisdiction over the United States. Under
the UNCITRAL rules, however, the European parties would have been forced to complain
to the tribunal itself, the same body that made the decision not to include the United States
in the arbitration. Had the tribunal been unwilling to reverse itself as most judicial bodies
are, the European parties would have been deprived of an opportunity for their complaint
to be objectively reviewed.
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K. Location of Arbitration
The procedures for selecting an arbitration location differ under
the ICC and UNCITRAL rules. The arbitration location is extremely
important during ICC arbitration since the law of the country where
arbitration occurs applies to the arbitral proceedings and the enforce-
ment of arbitral awards, unless the arbitrating parties stipulate oth-
erwise.7 1 Under the ICC rules, the hometown of one of the arbitrators
is usually the locale of arbitration, whereas under the UNCITRAL
rules, the arbitral tribunal chooses the arbitration locale. 79  Because
ICC arbitrators generally limit the choices for the arbitration location
to the arbitrators' hometowns, whereas the UNCITRAL arbitral tri-
bunal is not so restricted, the UNCITRAL arbitrators have more dis-
cretion than the ICC arbitrators to decide where arbitration will occur.
The UNCITRAL arbitrators are not limited to considering specific
factors, but have broad discretion to consider all the circumstances
of the arbitration in selecting the place of arbitration.80 Having a
wider field from which to choose, the UNCITRAL arbitral tribunal
may choose a convenient and objective arbitration location more easily
than the ICC arbitrator whose field is generally limited to three coun-
tries."' When many countries are involved in a contract dispute,
such as the Trans-Siberian pipeline dispute, there are many possible
arbitration locations: the hometown of either the arbitrators or the
arbitrating parties, or the place where the contract dispute arose.
Because the ICC rules limit the choices, the Trans-Siberian pipeline
78. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 26-27. The arbitration location must also provide
adequate support facilities, including hearing rooms, interpreters and stenographers; ensure
the security of the parties; and allow the parties to freely travel to the proceedings. Stein
& Wotman, supra note 13, at 1697.
79. Id. at 26; UNCITRAL RULES, art. 16. The ICC method of selection does not
account for the fact that physical evidence, witnesses, and parties involved in international
commercial disputes may be located in various countries. The rationale for this approach
is that arbitration will be delayed and expensive if the arbitrator is required to travel long
distances to the place of arbitration. However, the costs of obtaining physical evidence and
transporting witnesses will be greater than the cost of transporting the arbitrator to the place
of arbitration. Stein & Wotman, supra note 13, at 1698.
80. Stein & Wotman, supra note 13, at 1697.
81. Three arbitrators compose the typical ICC arbitral tribunal. See supra note 57
and accompanying text. Each arbitrator comes from a different country, and represents his
or her own country. Therefore, three countries are represented on the typical ICC tribunal
and one of those countries is the location of arbitration. See supra note 79 and accompanying
text.
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parties would have preferred to use the UNCITRAL rules in selecting
an arbitration location.8"
L. "Amiable Compositeur" Provisions
The procedural laws applicable during arbitration are determined
by the laws of the country where arbitration occurs, unless the parties
agree otherwise. During UNCITRAL arbitration, however, the UN-
CITRAL rules govern unless one of the rules conflicts with an ap-
plicable law of the country where arbitration occurs and from which
the parties cannot derogate.8 3  Should the parties not agree on the
substantive law to apply during arbitration, the arbitrators' power to
decide matters of law is similar under both sets of arbitration rules.
Neither the ICC nor the UNCITRAL arbitral tribunal is bound to
apply the conflict-of-law principles prevailing in the jurisdiction where
arbitration occurs.84  Moreover, the ICC and UNCITRAL rules give
the arbitrators "amiable compositeur" status, under which they may
waive a strict application of the law during arbitration. However, the
arbitrating parties must agree to this provision before the arbitrators
can decide legal issues in a manner inconsistent with the law chosen
to be used at the arbitral proceedings- 85 The purpose of this provision
is to give the arbitrators more flexibility in resolving disputes by not
limiting the arbitral tribunal to apply only one set of legal principles.
Because the ICC and the UNCITRAL arbitral tribunals may
waive a strict application of local substantive law and decide matters
of law according to their own legal principles, the law used during
arbitration proceedings may vary according to the location and the
composition of the tribunal. Consequently, the applicable law may
not be uniform, and the outcome of the proceedings may be unpre-
dictable. During complex multinational arbitration, however, it may
be difficult to arbitrate without waiving a strict application of local
law and applying the laws of different countries. Thus, flexibility is
82. For instance, had the United States agreed to arbitrate and had the arbitrators been
European, the ICC rules would have confined the arbitration location to Europe. If the most
convenient location for arbitration had been in the Soviet Union where the contract was to
be executed, however, the ICC rules would have precluded arbitration in the Soviet Union
because none of the arbitrators lived in the Soviet Union. The United States, on the other
hand, might have agreed to arbitrate under the UNCITRAL rules, knowing that arbitration
could occur in a location other than the arbitrators' hometowns and perhaps in a more
convenient and neutral location than Europe, such as Canada or Mexico.
83. UNCITRAL RULES, art. 1(2).
84. Stein & Wotman, supra note 13, at 1713.
85. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 27; UNCITRAL RULES, art. 33(1).
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more important than predictability in resolving international multi-
party disputes.8 6 For example, had the Trans-Siberian pipeline dis-
pute been arbitrated and French law exclusively applied during ar-
bitration, the dispute might not have been effectively resolved. But
had the arbitrators been allowed to apply other international legal
principles, the dispute could have been efficiently and equitably re-
solved.87  Because both the UNCITRAL and ICC rules contain an
amiable compositeur provision, the Trans-Siberian pipeline parties
would not have preferred either set of arbitration rules in this regard.
M. "Terms of Reference" Statements
The ICC rules include a "Terms of Reference" requirement
which the UNCITRAL rules do not include.8 8 An ICC Terms of
Reference statement 89 which must be compiled by the arbitral tribunal,
approved by the International Court of Arbitration, and signed by the
arbitrating parties before the statement can be used during arbitra-
tion. 9° This provision limits the ICC arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction
by forcing the arbitral tribunal to focus on disputed issues and guides
the tribunal in accepting evidence and testimony. Had the European
parties to the Trans-Siberian pipeline dispute been unable to perform
their contracts with the Soviet Union because of President Reagan's
sanctions and had they arbitrated their disputes with the Soviet Union,
the arbitrators would have been unable to hear the European com-
panies' complaint against the United States unless the Reagan sanc-
tions issue was listed in the Terms of Reference statement.
The ICC Terms of Reference requirement is particularly impor-
tant in resolving multi-party disputes which involve complicated facts,
86. Using an amiable compositeur provision may also cause problems in later pro-
ceedings to enforce the arbitral award in those countries where the tribunal is required to
follow the law of the place of arbitration in resolving the dispute. Stein & Wotman, supra
note 13, at 1714.
87. Different legal approaches dictated the actions of the various parties to the Trans-
Siberian pipeline dispute. These different approaches should have been considered in re-
solving the dispute. President Reagan's actions may have been "legal" under United States
law, but may have been illegal under French law. To exclusively apply United States law
would allow Reagan's embargo to stand and unjustly deprive the affected French companies
of a remedy at law. To exclusively apply French law would unjustly invalidate President
Reagan's "legal" action. Therefore, had United States and French law been applied, a
compromise between the two positions, and a solution to the dispute, might have been
achieved.
88. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 28.
89. A Terms of Reference statement includes a summary of the parties' respective
claims and a definition of the issues to be determined. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 28.
90. Id.
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voluminous evidence, and numerous witnesses, because it precludes
the arbitral tribunal from hearing irrelevant facts, determines which
issues the arbitral tribunal may hear, and ultimately dictates the out-
come of arbitration. Hence, the Terms of Reference requirement, if
improperly drafted, may seriously undermine the arbitration process.
To prevent this from occurring, the International Court of Arbitration
reviews and corrects any errors in the Terms of Reference statement
drafted by the arbitrators and informs all of the arbitrating parties
about the statement's contents so that they may review the statement.
The advantages of the ICC Terms of Reference requirement
coupled with the safeguards against possible abuses of this requirement
make this provision an invaluable component of multi-party arbitra-
tion. 91 Unfortunately, the UNCITRAL rules do not include a Terms
of Reference provision. For these reasons, had the Trans-Siberian
pipeline dispute been arbitrated, the arbitrating parties would have
preferred to arbitrate under the ICC rules.
N. Procedures During Arbitration Hearings
The arbitration hearing procedures are similar under the ICC and
UNCITRAL rules. Under both sets of rules, the arbitral tribunal may
conduct the proceedings in whatever manner it considers appropriate.
Arbitral hearings are informal non-jury proceedings held in camera,
and are usually conducted according to the law of the jurisdiction
from which the chairman comes or where arbitration oc-
curs. 93 However, the burden of producing evidence falls differently
under the two sets of rules. During ICC arbitration, the arbitrators
may use whatever means necessary to ascertain the facts of a case.
The ICC arbitrators decide which documents are required to decide
the case, may request the arbitrating parties to produce these docu-
ments, and may terminate the hearing when they have sufficient in-
formation to make an award. 94  Under the UNCITRAL rules, the
91. The utility of the ICC Terms of Reference procedure is disputed. Some com-
mentators consider the procedure a "significant obstacle, delaying commencement of the
arbitration proceeding . . . " while others claim that the procedure is extremely valuable,
"resolving key procedural issues at an early state." Stein & Wotman, supra note 13, at
1699 n.86.
92. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 28-29; UNCITRAL RULES, art. 15(1).
93. Stein & Wotman, supra note 13, at 1715.
94. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 28-29. In short, ICC arbitrators have unlimited
authority to conduct arbitration hearings in whatever manner necessary to ascertain the facts
of a case. This may include the acceptance of secondary and hearsay evidence. Bixler &
James, supra note 1, at 5.
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arbitrating parties have the burden of producing evidence. The
UNCITRAL arbitral tribunal may require each arbitrating party to
deliver a summary of the documents and evidence it intends to present
during the arbitration to the other arbitrating parties. 95 The UNCI-
TRAL arbitrators determine the admissibility and weight of evidence
presented to the tribunal, but may not specifically request the arbi-
trating parties to produce relevant documents. 96  Although the tri-
bunal may summon witnesses, it must give the parties a full oppor-
tunity to present their cases. 97
Arbitrating parties may prefer the ICC rules over the UNCITRAL
rules because the burden of producing evidence under the UNCITRAL
rules falls mostly on the arbitrating parties. This burden may be
particularly difficult to meet when international multi-party disputes
involving complicated facts and an overwhelming amount of evidence
are arbitrated. Under the ICC rules, the arbitral tribunal helps the
arbitrating parties decide which documents and evidence are relevant
to resolve the dispute. The parties may still be required to spend time
and money producing documents for the tribunal, but do not need to
prepare their cases as carefully as parties arbitrating under the UN-
CITRAL rules. On the other hand, arbitrating parties under the UN-
CITRAL rules may have more control over the evidence produced
for and eventually reviewed by the arbitrators. For example, had the
Trans-Siberian pipeline dispute been arbitrated pursuant to the UN-
CITRAL rules, the European companies would have incurred tre-
mendous expenses to gather sufficient evidence to prove that they had
been unable to perform their contracts with the Soviet Union because
of President Reagan's sanctions. Had the dispute been arbitrated
under the ICC rules, the arbitral tribunal would have incurred some
of the expenses to gather the evidence required to resolve the dispute.
Therefore, because the arbitrating parties would have spent more time
and money preparing their cases under the UNCITRAL rules than the
ICC rules, the parties to the Trans-Siberian pipeline dispute would
95. UNCITRAL RULES, arts. 15, 24. A provision in the UNCITRAL Rules also
requires each arbitrating party presenting witnesses at the arbitration hearing to give the
witnesses' names and addresses, and a description of the subject matter of the witnesses'
testimony to all other arbitrating parties 15 days before the hearing begins. Id. at art. 25(2).
This provision prevents "surprise" witnesses from testifying at the arbitration hearing and
allows the arbitrating parties to thoroughly prepare their cases. Therefore, a witness testimony
disclosure requirement similar to the UNCITRAL requirement is particularly useful during
multi-party contract arbitration when numerous witnesses may testify.
96. UNCITRAL RULES, arts. 24(3), 25(6).
97. UNCITRAL RULES, arts. 16(2), 15(1).
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have preferred to arbitrate under the ICC rules.
0. Expert Testimony
Both the ICC and the UNCITRAL rules allow the introduction
of expert testimony at the arbitration hearing. Under both sets of
rules, the arbitral tribunal has sole discretion, whether on its own
accord or upon a party's request, to appoint or hear expert testimony.
A report is made by an expert chosen by the arbitral tribunal and sent
to the arbitrating parties for comments. 9 This provision allows the
arbitrators to consider the "expert report" and the parties' comments
to the report in lieu of interrogating the expert and permitting the
arbitrating parties to cross-examine the expert during the hearing. An
expert report, however, may not be an adequate substitute for the
interrogation of experts before the arbitral tribunal because interro-
gation is designed to elicit facts and allow the expert's credibility to
be assessed. Therefore, precluding expert interrogation during ar-
bitration hearings may not help the arbitral tribunal effectively resolve
disputes. The UNCITRAL rules, however, differ from the ICC rules
in that during UNCITRAL arbitration, should the tribunal choose to
hear expert testimony, the parties may interrogate the expert at the
hearing. Moreover, the parties may present their own experts to
testify before the tribunal. 99 Because the Trans-Siberian pipeline
dispute involved complex factual and legal issues, the testimony of
many experts would have been required to help the arbitral tribunal
resolve the dispute. In this respect, the arbitrating parties would have
preferred the UNCITRAL rules to the ICC rules because the arbitrators
could have interrogated the experts at the arbitration hearing and
presented their own experts to testify. Had the dispute been arbitrated
under the ICC rules, the experts' contribution to the arbitration would
have been limited to the contents of the expert report. Moreover,
challenges to the credibility and qualifications of the experts would
have been restricted to written comments on the report, an inadequate
substitute for in-person cross-examination.
P. Default Provisions
Both the UNCITRAL and ICC rules include default provisions
which allow arbitration hearings to proceed even though one or more
98. UNCITRAL RULES, art. 27; ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 29.
99. UNCITRAL RULES, art. 27.
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of the parties who signed the arbitration agreement does not appear
at the hearing.' 00 In addition, the UNCITRAL rules allow the pro-
ceedings to continue even though an arbitrating party did not file a
Statement of Defense with the arbitral tribunal within the prescribed
time period. 10 By allowing arbitration to continue in the absence
of an arbitrating party, these default provisions encourage aggrieved
parties to appear and represent themselves at the hearing or assume
that risk that the arbitration will continue without the absent parties
being represented. The provisions also move disputes quickly through
the arbitration process. If the ICC and UNCITRAL rules did not
include default provisions, multi-party dispute arbitration could be
prolonged for months or years while the arbitral tribunal waited until
every party appeared at the hearing or filed statements of defense
before commencing arbitration.
The ICC default provisions, however, do not take into account
the complexity of multi-party disputes. Arbitrating parties who cannot
appear at the hearing for legitimate reasons are deprived of their right
to be represented. 0 2 Under the UNCITRAL rules, however, a party
may postpone the commencement of arbitration until a Statement of
Defense is filed if sufficent cause for the delay may be shown. 03 For
example, had the United States agreed to arbitrate the Trans-Siberian
pipeline dispute under the ICC rules even though it did not have
enough information to file a Statement of Defense within the time
prescribed by the arbitral tribunal, the hearing would have nonetheless
continued. Under the UNCITRAL rules, had the United States shown
sufficient cause for its failure to file a Statement of Defense, the
arbitration would not have proceeded until the United States had filed
its statement, whereas arbitration under the ICC rules would have
continued despite the showing of sufficient cause. Therefore, if a
party anticipates problems in filing a Statement of Defense, which
could readily occur in complex multi-party disputes, in this respect,
the UNCITRAL rules would have been preferred because they toll
arbitration proceedings for good cause.
Q. Arbitration Awards
The procedures for making arbitration awards differ under the
UNCITRAL and ICC rules. Awards made by a UNCITRAL arbitral
100. UNCITRAL RULES, art. 28(2); ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 15.
101. UNCITRAL RULES, art. 28(1).
102. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 15.
103. UNCITRAL RULES, art. 28(2).
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tribunal are final and binding, whereas the International Court of
Arbitration must approve awards made by the ICC arbitral tri-
bunal.'°4 By requiring a separate international judicial body to re-
view awards made by the arbitral tribunal, the ICC rules provide for
objective review of arbitration awards and avoid involving local courts
in the process. Under the UNCITRAL rules, the arbitrating parties
may request the tribunal to correct or supplement the award within
thirty days after the arbitrating parties receive the award. 0 5  Similar
to the ICC review process, this procedure does not allow the local
courts to review the award. 0 6  However, the UNCITRAL rules are
different because they allow the same body which made the award
to review the award. This provision is undesirable because the arbitral
tribunal may be reluctant to admit that it made an erroneous decision
and to correct or supplement the award. Therefore, in this respect,
arbitrating parties may prefer ICC arbitration over UNCITRAL
arbitration.
The time within which arbitral tribunals must make awards also
differs under the UNCITRAL and ICC rules. The UNCITRAL rules
do not include a time limit, whereas the ICC rules require the arbitral
tribunal to make an award within sixty days from the date when the
arbitrating parties signed the Terms of Reference. 0 7  The sixty-day
time limit forces the arbitral tribunal to resolve disputes quickly, but
may be an unrealistic limitation when complex disputes are arbitrated.
Consequently, the ICC rules permit the arbitral tribunal to extend the
sixty-day period if the tribunal needs more time to arbitrate complex
disputes, 0 8 such as the Trans-Siberian pipeline controversy. There-
fore, in effect, neither set of rules limits the period within which the
arbitral tribunal must make awards.
Provisions relating to settlement arbitration awards, i.e. awards
made by the arbitral tribunal after the arbitrating parties have settled
104. UNCITRAL RULES, art. 31; ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 31. The International
Court of Arbitration reviews the arbitral tribunal's award and remands the award to the
tribunal for revision if the award is inconsistent with the Terms of Reference statement
submitted in the case. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 31. The International Court of
Arbitration is also permitted to bring substantive problems with the arbitral award to the
arbitrators' attention for further consideration. Stein & Wotman, supra note 13, at 1720.
105. UNCITRAL RULES, arts. 35-37.
106. If the local court is allowed to correct or supplement the award, several goals of
arbitration are undermined. Specifically, the enforcement of the award is delayed, costs are
increased, and the award itself is no longer final and binding. Stein & Wotman, supra note
13, at 1721.
107. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 30.
108. Id.
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their differences, are significantly different under the ICC and UN-
CITRAL rules. Under the ICC rules, the arbitral tribunal must record
settlement arbitration awards, 09 and the awards become part of the
public record. In contrast, settlement arbitration awards made during
UNCITRAL arbitration are recorded only if the settling parties agree
to record the awards." 0 This is an important difference because
business entities generally prefer not to publicize their legal problems
and thus, prefer that arbitral awards rendered against them not be
recorded. Therefore, arbitrating parties who anticipate settling their
dispute before an award is rendered may prefer the UNCITRAL rules
over the ICC rules because the UNCITRAL rules give the settling
parties an option to record settlement arbitration awards. Had the
Trans-Siberian pipeline dispute been arbitrated, the United States would
have been more likely to arbitrate under the UNCITRAL rules than
the ICC rules, knowing that any settlement reached with the European
companies against the United States would not have to be recorded
and thus, would avoid bad publicity in the international business
community.
R. Arbitration Costs
The methods of determining international arbitration costs are
different under the two sets of rules. The ICC bases the administrative
and arbitrator fees on the amount at issue in the arbitration and ac-
cording to predetermined percentage schedules. Hence, ICC arbitra-
tion costs increase as the amount of the claim increases. "' Because
the administrative fees are used to support ICC activities in other areas
besides arbitration, ICC arbitration costs are higher than the actual
costs and value of the arbitration services provided. "2 UNCITRAL
administrative fees, however, are determined by the arbitral tribunal
itself. 1"3 Under the UNCITRAL rules, the arbitrators' fees are to be
"reasonable in amount," and the arbitral tribunal considers interna-
tional fee schedules in setting arbitrators' fees only if the tribunal
determines it is "appropriate in the circumstances of the
case."' 114 Therefore, UNCITRAL arbitration fees accurately reflect
109. Id.
110. UNCITRAL RULES, art. 34(1).
111. Stein & Wotman, supra note 13, at 1722.
112. Id. The ICC will fix the arbitration costs at a lower figure than the percentage
schedules dictate only in exceptional circumstances. Id. at 1723.
113. UNCITRAL RULES, art. 38.
114. UNCITRAL RULES, art. 39.
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the administrative costs and value of the arbitrator services rendered
during arbitration. Because international multi-party disputes are
complex and generally involve large claims, the costs of arbitrating
such disputes under the ICC rules which do not accurately represent
the actual costs of arbitration, would be higher than UNCITRAL
arbitration costs. Hence, with regard to costs, the parties to the
complex Trans-Siberian pipeline dispute would have preferred the
UNCITRAL rules.
The method of distributing arbitration costs is similar under both
the ICC and UNCITRAL rules. Under both sets of rules, the un-
successful arbitrating parties pay all arbitration expenses, which in-
clude the arbitrators' fees and travel expenses, witness and expert
fees, and administrative fees.1 5  The UNCITRAL rules, however,
specifically permit the arbitral tribunal to apportion arbitration ex-
penses between all arbitrating parties if the tribunal "determines that
apportionment is reasonable, taking into account the circumstances
of the case." 116  This provision is important when multi-party dis-
putes are arbitrated because the cost of arbitrating such disputes is
particularly high. The cost of arbitrating the Trans-Siberian pipeline
dispute, for example, would have been exorbitant, considering the
number of arbitrating parties, the complexity of the factual and legal
issues, the duration of arbitration, the distances traveled to the arbi-
tration location, and the translation costs. 117  The ICC rules, how-
ever, are not as explicit as the UNCITRAL rules in allowing the
arbitral tribunal to apportion arbitration costs between the par-
ties." '8 The apportionment provision of the ICC rules is vague and
does not provide the arbitrator with specific guidelines on how to
apportion costs. Therefore, the United States would have been more
likely to arbitrate the pipeline dispute under the UNCITRAL rules
than the ICC rules, knowing that if the arbitral tribunal had ruled
against the United States, the tribunal would have been more likely
to apportion costs between all the arbitrating parties, and thus, it
would not have had to pay all the arbitration expenses.
115. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 30-31; UNCITRAL RULES, arts. 39, 40.
116. UNCITRAL RULES, art. 40(1).
117. The arbitral tribunal considers these factors in determining the costs of arbitration.
UNCITRAL RULES, art. 38.
118. The apportionment provision of the ICC rules states that the arbitrator has discretion
to decide which party shall bear the costs of arbitration, or in what proportion the costs shall
be distributed. ICC RULES, supra note 14, at 34-35.
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S. Recent Amendments to the ICC Arbitration Rules
The ICC and UNCITRAL rules have not been significantly
amended since they were drafted in 1975 and 1976, respectively. In
1980, however, the International Court of Arbitration adopted a new
rule which allows the court's arbitration powers to be partially del-
egated to a "Committee of the Court." Under the ICC rules, this
Committee of the Court, consisting of the chairman and two members
of the International Court of Arbitration, decides routine cases and
prepares preliminary reports on complex cases. 19 Based on these
preliminary reports, the court as a whole, then resolves the complex
cases. 20 The UNCITRAL rules have not been amended to include
a similar committee rule.
The new committee rule may help effectively resolve multi-party
disputes only if the committee is qualified to prepare these preliminary
reports. If the International Court of Arbitration were to make a
decision based on an erroneous preliminary report, the entire arbitra-
tion process would be undermined. If members of the International
Court of Arbitration are qualified as arbitrators, the Committee of the
Court should also be qualified to prepare the preliminary reports.
However, whether the members of the International Court of Arbi-
tration are qualified as arbitrators is an issue to be determined by
arbitrating parties. For example, had the complex Trans-Siberian
pipeline dispute been arbitrated under the ICC rules, and the Inter-
national Court of Arbitration reviewed the final arbitration award as
the court must do under the ICC rules, the Committee of the Court
would have probably prepared a preliminary report for the court to
use in reviewing the award. Hence, the committee's qualifications
to prepare a preliminary report on such a complex dispute would have
been extremely important to the arbitrating parties. Had the arbitrating
parties considered the committee to be unqualified to prepare a pre-
liminary report on the dispute for the court, the parties would have
preferred to arbitrate under the UNCITRAL rules, which do not pro-
vide for review by a Committee of the Court.
Another aspect of the committee approach which may deter ag-
grieved parties from ICC arbitration is the absence of guidelines within
which the committee works. The committee prepares preliminary
reports for the International Court of Arbitration to use in resolving
119. The Committee has bimonthly meetings, and must reach unanimous decisions.
Stein & Wotman, supra note 13, at 1695.
120. Derains, supra note 3, at 51.
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complex disputes. The full court approves the arbitration award be-
cause the expertise of each member is needed to determine whether
or not the award is appropriate. The expertise of the full court is
particularly useful when complex multi-party disputes are involved.
Once the committee exceeds its authority and expertise in deciding
preliminary matters, and begins to act as the court, the committee
approach becomes ineffective.
Moreover, because the terms "preliminary" and "routine" are
vague, the ICC rules offer no specific guidelines to the committee on
what it can decide. Without guidelines, the committee may easily
exceed its authority and competence in deciding preliminary and rou-
tine issues. Should the committee exceed its ill-defined authority and
make inappropriate decisions upon which the court will base its ap-
proval of arbitral awards, the rights of the arbitrating parties may be
undermined. Thus, whether ICC arbitration will be chosen over UN-
CITRAL arbitration may depend on how well the committee stays
within its boundaries and decides only "preliminary" and "routine"
matters. If the committee decides matters beyond the scope of their
competence and authority, arbitrating parties will prefer the UNCI-
TRAL rules which do not include a committee provision.
VI. PROPOSALS TO CHANGE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION RULES
The ICC and UNCITRAL arbitration rules do not adequately
resolve multi-party disputes because neither set of rules permits con-
solidation or intervention by third parties. Consolidation of arbitra-
tions prevents arbitral tribunals from making conflicting rulings in
related cases. For example, under California arbitration rules, arbi-
trating parties may petition the court to consolidate arbitration pro-
ceedings. The court may also consolidate sua sponte when the same
parties are involved in the proceedings, and the disputes arise from
related transactions. Once consolidation occurs, the court resolves
conflicts between the consolidated arbitration clauses and determines
the rights of the parties during one arbitral proceeding. 2' Like con-
solidation, intervention allows third parties to participate in arbitration
proceedings between contracting parties. To intervene, however, third
parties need not be parties to the contract upon which the dispute is
based, but may intervene only if their rights would be substantially
121. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.3 (West 1982). See generally ACRET, ATrORNEY'S
GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND DISPUTES § 5.7 (1976 & Supp. 1982).
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affected by the final arbitration decision. 122  Had the United States
arbitrated the legality of President Reagan's sanctions against the
French and British companies involved in the Trans-Siberian pipeline
dispute, and had the California arbitration procedures for consolidation
and intervention been available to the arbitrating parties, Italy could
have intervened in the arbitration. Because Italy's performance of its
contract with the Soviet Union was also hindered by Reagan's em-
bargo, Italy's rights would have been substantially affected by the
final arbitration decision, and hence, intervention would have been
appropriate.
Consolidation and/or intervention are used when third parties
cause or are affected by, disputes which arise between contracting
parties. The purpose of these procedural devices is to reduce the
costs and time involved in resolving numerous disputes that arise from
the same transaction or occurrence. For example, the Soviet Union
was directly affected by the dispute which arose between the United
States and the European companies supplying materials to the pipeline
project. By imposing sanctions, the United States hindered the Eu-
ropean companies' performance of their contracts with the Soviet
Union. Separately arbitrating each dispute that arose from the pipeline
project would have been expensive and inefficient. Therefore, rather
than separately arbitrating each dispute, all disputes could have been
consolidated and arbitrated in one proceeding. Under the ICC rules,
however, the International Court of Arbitration cannot consolidate
arbitration proceedings or allow third parties to intervene.' 23  The
UNCITRAL rules contain a similar provision. 2 4  Under both sets of
rules, arbitration proceedings cannot be consolidated nor may third
parties intervene unless all of the arbitrating parties consent to the
consolidation or intervention, and obtaining consent is a difficult, if
not impossible, task when various foreign entities are involved.25
122. See generally 2 CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL (VOL. 11) §§ 25. 1,
25.10 (C.E.B. 1978).
123. Comment, supra note 4, at 548.
124. Id. at 546.
125. Id. at 548. Consent is "obtained" by coordinating the arbitration clauses of all
the consenting parties with regard to the applicable substantive law during arbitration, the
composition of the arbitral tribunal, and the procedural rules to be used at the arbitration
hearing. Id. at 546. For example, had the Soviet Union and the European suppliers to the
pipeline project arbitrated their dispute (the "primary dispute" for purposes of this dis-
cussion), the United States' dispute with the suppliers would have been consolidated with
the primary dispute only if the Soviet Union, the European companies, and the United States
had unanimously consented to the consolidation by agreeing on the legal principles and
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Because the ICC rules do not permit consolidation of arbitration
proceedings, the International Court of Arbitration has proposed sev-
eral alternatives to consolidation. These alternatives are designed to
reduce the time spent by ICC arbitral tribunals resolving related cases
by allowing testimony admitted at one proceeding to be automatically
admitted at related proceedings. The first alternative suggests that
the ICC nominate the same persons to arbitrate related cases. The
second alternative recommends that arbitrating parties appoint the
same arbitral tribunal to resolve related disputes. The third alternative
suggests that the same arbitral tribunal examine related cases in chron-
ological order. 126 The success of these alternatives depends on the
selection and composition of the arbitral tribunal. If the arbitral tri-
bunal is qualified to effectively resolve the original dispute, it will
also be qualified to handle related cases. Moreover, because these
alternatives are proposed within the context of the current ICC rules,
the success of the alternatives as a substitute for consolidation depends
on how effective the current rules are in resolving multi-party disputes.
Without modifying the current ICC rules, however, these alternatives
will not accomplish their purpose.
For the ICC and UNCITRAL arbitration rules to be effective in
resolving multi-party disputes, arbitrators must be well qualified. The
current methods used to select ICC and UNCITRAL arbitrators do
not guarantee that the arbitrators will be qualified to resolve inter-
national multi-party disputes. If arbitrators were selected from a field
of arbitrators who arbitrate domestic multi-party disputes, the arbi-
trators would have adequate experience. Even though international
multi-party disputes may be more complex than domestic multi-party
disputes, many of the legal principles used to arbitrate domestic dis-
putes are applicable to resolve international disputes. Arbitrators with
this kind of experience are more likely to effectively resolve such
disputes than persons without similar experience. For example, ar-
bitrators that have arbitrated domestic construction contract disputes
are more qualified to arbitrate the Trans-Siberian pipeline dispute than
arbitrators that have resolved only domestic labor disputes.
If the ICC and UNCITRAL rules guaranteed that the arbitrators
were qualified to arbitrate multi-party disputes, various problems with
the two sets of rules would be corrected. If the UNCITRAL ap-
procedural rules to be used during arbitration, the location of arbitration, and the composition
of the arbitral tribunal. For the Soviet Union, the European companies, and the United
States to have unanimously agreed on all these matters would have been extremely difficult.
126. Comment, supra note 4, at 547-48.
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pointing authority were well qualified, the arbitrators chosen by the
authority would also be well qualified. The Terms of Reference
Statement drafted by arbitrators would be accurate and complete if
the arbitrators were experienced in arbitrating multi-party disputes.
ICC and UNCITRAL expert reports would also be complete and
accurate if well qualified arbitrators prepared the reports, thus reducing
the need to interrogate experts during arbitration.
Even if the qualifications of ICC and UNCITRAL arbitrators
were guaranteed, the UNCITRAL rules would not effectively resolve
international multi-party disputes until they are amended to require
certain arbitrator actions to be reviewed. Unlike the ICC rules, the
UNCITRAL rules do not require a separate judicial body to review
UNCITRAL arbitrator actions.' 27  The ICC requirement is designed
to correct erroneous decisions made by arbitrators and to discourage
them from abusing their discretionary powers at important stages of
the arbitration proceedings. For these reasons, the UNCITRAL rules
should require a separate tribunal to review the arbitrator decisions
as is required by the ICC rules.' 28  The tribunal should review chal-
lenges to the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction, decisions relating to the
rules' default provisions, and final arbitration awards. UNCITRAL
needs to create a new judicial body to review these procedures. The
new tribunal's role in UNCITRAL arbitration should be limited to
reviewing arbitrator decisions and should not include arbitration itself.
If the new tribunal were to arbitrate disputes, parties would be pre-
cluded from selecting their own arbitrators, and private arbitration
conducted under the UNCITRAL rules would become institutional
arbitration.
Permitting third parties to appear and testify at arbitral hearings
without being legally bound to the arbitration decision' 29 would also
assure effective resolution of multi-party disputes. This would en-
courage a party to participate in arbitration as it would be unnecessary
to obtain the party's consent to arbitrate. For example, had the Trans-
Siberian pipeline dispute been arbitrated and the arbitrators decided
that the United States' sanctions imposed on the European suppliers
127. The International Court of Arbitration reviews certain actions of ICC arbitral
tribunals.
128. It should be emphasized that the tribunal which is proposed should be international
in nature. To avoid review of arbitrator decisions by local courts, one of the goals of
arbitration, the tribunal should include neutral international arbitrators, and be created in a
manner similar to the selection of the ICC International Court of Arbitration.
129. Comment, supra note 4, at 546-47.
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prevented those companies from performing their contracts with the
Soviet Union and were therefore unlawful, by merely appearing at
the arbitral hearing and not consenting to be bound by the tribunal's
decision, the United States would not have been required to lift the
sanctions. Thus, the United States would have been encouraged to
attend the hearing and give relevant information to the arbitral tribunal
because it would not have been bound by the arbitrators' final decision.
Another alternative to the current ICC and UNCITRAL rules
would be to create a separate legal organization to exclusively arbitrate
international multi-party contract disputes. Such an organization would
eliminate the need for institutional and private arbitration in this
area.'30 The advantages of both the ICC and UNCITRAL arbitration
rules could be combined into one set of arbitration rules which would
control international multi-party contract dispute arbitration through
this organization. This organization would maintain separate divi-
sions and specialized rules to resolve particular kinds of multi-party
contract disputes. For example, one division, supplied with its own
personnel and rules adapted to settle international construction in-
dustry problems, would resolve multi-party construction contract dis-
putes, while another division would settle international multi-party
labor disputes.
The creation of one set of international multi-party contract dis-
pute arbitration rules, however, would not eliminate the need for the
UNCITRAL and ICC arbitration rules. The ICC and UNCITRAL
rules would still be used to resolve simple disputes. For example,
ICC and UNCITRAL arbitrators would not arbitrate a case that they
believed was too complex to be effectively resolved under either the
ICC or UNCITRAL rules, but they would send the case to the inter-
national multi-party arbitration organization to be resolved under the
''multi-party arbitration" rules. Similarly, "multi-party arbitrators"
would transfer a case to be arbitrated under the ICC or UNCITRAL
rules if the arbitrators believed the case was not complex enough to
warrant multi-party arbitration. In effect, each arbitral tribunal would
have discretion to hear each case submitted to it. Although parties
to an international multi-party contract dispute might refuse to use
multi-party arbitration, the parties would benefit more from using
multi-party arbitration rather than the UNCITRAL or ICC rules since
neither UNCITRAL nor ICC rules may adequately resolve such dis-
130. For a discussion of the problems in eliminating ad hoc arbitration, see Part VII
of this comment.
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putes. By giving ICC and UNCITRAL arbitrators the authority to
transfer cases to multi-party arbitration, parties that refuse to use multi-
party arbitration would be forced to comply with the arbitrators' de-
cision or not arbitrate. By foreclosing the possibility of arbitrating
international disputes and forcing parties to litigate their disputes in
foreign jurisdictions, multi-party arbitration would, in effect, become
mandatory.
VII. CONCLUSION
Arbitrating international multi-party disputes is more advanta-
geous than litigating such disputes. However, current international
commercial arbitration rules cannot effectively resolve these disputes.
The Trans-Siberian pipeline dispute serves as an example of an in-
ternational multi-party contract dispute which would not have been
effectively resolved under the current arbitration rules. The ICC
arbitration rules, illustrative of institutional or agency-administered
arbitration rules, would have adequately resolved certain aspects of
the dispute, whereas the UNCITRAL rules, which guide ad hoc or
private arbitration, would have adequately resolved other aspects of
the dispute. Because neither set of rules alone can adequately resolve
multi-party disputes, current arbitration rules should be modified or
replaced.
If current arbitration rules are not modified, new international
multi-party arbitration rules should be created. To effectively resolve
multi-party disputes, new international multi-party arbitration rules
should allow related arbitral proceedings to be consolidated and third
parties to intervene in arbitral proceedings between contracting parties.
Moreover, the new arbitration rules should include procedures to
guarantee that arbitrators are qualified to resolve multi-party disputes
and should require an international judicial body, detached from the
arbitration process, to review arbitrator decisions.
International multi-party contract disputes can be most effectively
resolved by combining the advantages of the various international
commercial arbitration rules into one set of multi-party arbitration
rules. A multi-party arbitration organization should also be created
to draft, implement, and enforce multi-party arbitration rules. The
multi-party arbitration organization would exclusively administer multi-
party contract disputes, utilizing the multi-party arbitration rules. The
resources required to establish the multi-party arbitration organization
could be donated by businesses interested in developing efficient and
equitable arbitration procedures in the international business
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community.
If a multi-party arbitration organization were established, con-
tracting parties would no longer incur expenses during the formation
of contracts deciding which arbitration organization or arbitration
procedures should be used to resolve disputes that might arise under
the contract. Once the multi-party arbitration organization decides
what constitutes a multi-party dispute, any international dispute that
qualifies under the organization's definition would automatically be
arbitrated pursuant to the organization's multi-party arbitration rules.
By forcing multi-party disputes to be arbitrated by an international
organization according to established rules, institutional arbitration
would in effect replace ad hoc arbitration with respect to international
multi-party disputes. Because one of the advantages of ad hoc ar-
bitration is permitting the arbitrating parties themselves to select the
parameters of the arbitral proceedings, thus encouraging disputing
parties to arbitrate rather than litigate, eliminating ad hoc arbitration
may discourage arbitration, and more importantly, international
contracting.
Once the success of the international multi-party dispute arbi-
tration organization becomes apparent, however, contracting parties
will no longer need ad hoc arbitration to resolve disputes. Knowing
that a neutral, diversified international organization will arbitrate com-
plex disputes according to successful and effective arbitration rules,
contracting parties would not hesitate to make international contracts
because they would no longer be uncertain about the effects and
ultimate outcome of arbitrating disputes that might arise under the
contract. Moreover, by replacing ad hoc arbitration with institutional
arbitration administered by the multi-party arbitration organization,
contracting parties would no longer spend time and money drafting
complex, and often irreconciliable arbitration agreements between all
the parties to a multi-party contract. In short, the alternatives for
resolving multi-party disputes would be narrowed to litigation or ar-
bitration under the multi-party arbitration rules.
Undoubtedly, some qualifying parties might refuse to arbitrate
under the multi-party arbitration rules and try to arbitrate their dispute
with another organization or under other arbitration rules. To en-
courage these parties to use the multi-party arbitration rules, the ad-
vantages of the new arbitration rules should be widely publicized in
the international business and legal communities, as well as to persons
that arbitrate international contract disputes. If international arbitra-
tors were encouraged to use the new rules and refuse to arbitrate under
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rules other than the new multi-party arbitration rules, a professional
standard would be established within the international arbitration com-
munity which international arbitrators would hesitate to violate. Ul-
timately, all international business would arbitrate under the new
multi-party arbitration rules. Consequently, international commercial
arbitration would be more effective and equitable than current inter-
national commercial arbitration, and international contracting would
be stimulated.
E. Scott Fraser
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